Copyright Fee Awards Under Section 505 After Kirtsaeng
Copyright fee awards under Section 505 remain discretionary after Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 579 U.S. 197 (2016). Courts must give substantial weight to the losing party’s objective reasonableness while considering every other relevant circumstance.
For copyright litigators, that distinction affects case assessment, settlement strategy, and postjudgment motions: winning establishes neither an entitlement to fees nor protection against an opponent’s fee request. The analysis begins with statutory eligibility, then separates the reasons for shifting fees from the evidence supporting their amount.
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ToggleKey Takeaways
- Section 505 permits reasonable attorney’s fees for prevailing plaintiffs and defendants, without automatic recovery for either side.
- Objective reasonableness carries substantial weight, but litigation misconduct and compensation or deterrence concerns can justify a different outcome.
- Registration restrictions, prevailing-party status, procedural deadlines, and billing evidence require separate analysis before the court determines whether and how much to award.
What Section 505 Authorizes
Under 17 U.S.C. § 505, a court may award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of costs. The statute gives courts discretion rather than a mandatory fee-shifting rule.
Plaintiffs and defendants receive evenhanded treatment
A successful copyright owner may seek fees, but a successful defendant may do so as well. Courts cannot apply a more demanding entitlement standard merely because the prevailing party defeated an infringement claim.
That symmetry supports copyright’s broader purposes. Meritorious defenses can protect lawful copying, preserve public access, and establish the boundaries of exclusive rights. Fee analysis therefore considers the value of defending a sound position alongside the value of enforcing one.
Eligibility and discretion are separate questions
Counsel should first establish prevailing-party status and identify any statutory restriction. Only then does the court decide whether the circumstances justify shifting fees.
A favorable outcome does not collapse those inquiries. Likewise, a strong argument for deterrence cannot overcome a statutory bar that makes an owner’s fees unavailable. Keeping these questions separate also helps parties distinguish a potential recovery from a dependable litigation-budget assumption.
How Fogerty Frames the Fee Inquiry
In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 & n.19 (1994), the Supreme Court rejected different fee standards for prevailing plaintiffs and defendants.
The Court identified nonexclusive considerations: frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness in factual and legal positions, and the need for compensation and deterrence. Those considerations guide discretion; they do not create a mechanical scoring system.
A position may fail without being frivolous. Similarly, a party may advance a plausible interpretation of copyright law while conducting litigation in ways that support a fee award against it.
The court must connect its analysis to copyright’s purposes. Compensation and deterrence require attention to the particular dispute, rather than a general preference for rewarding winners or penalizing losers.
For motion practice, this means identifying the conduct or position that warrants a financial consequence. Merely reciting the Fogerty considerations leaves the court without a case-specific explanation for exercising its discretion.
What Kirtsaeng Changed About Copyright Fee Awards
The fee dispute followed Supap Kirtsaeng’s successful challenge to John Wiley & Sons’ infringement claims concerning imported textbooks. His earlier Supreme Court victory addressed the first-sale doctrine. The 2016 decision addressed his subsequent request for attorney’s fees.
Objective reasonableness receives substantial weight
In the Supreme Court’s Kirtsaeng decision, the Court explained why objective reasonableness deserves substantial weight. Parties should have incentives to pursue strong claims and defenses and abandon weak ones.
That approach can help potential litigants assess financial exposure before committing to expensive litigation. It also avoids making fee recovery depend primarily on whether a case ultimately produces an important legal ruling, something parties cannot reliably predict at filing.
The inquiry concerns the strength of the losing party’s position, rather than the winner’s success alone. A merits ruling supplies important context, but its outcome does not answer whether the unsuccessful position was reasonable.
Substantial weight does not create a presumption
The Court also emphasized that reasonableness cannot control the entire inquiry. Courts must consider other relevant circumstances, even when the losing party advanced an objectively reasonable position.
Conversely, an unreasonable position does not automatically require a fee award. Section 505 still calls for an exercise of discretion.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the judgment. It did not direct an award to Kirtsaeng. That procedural result matters because the decision establishes an analytical framework, rather than a rule guaranteeing compensation whenever a defendant successfully clarifies copyright law.
Applying Objective Reasonableness to the Record
The strongest fee arguments connect governing law to the evidence available during the litigation. Labels such as “baseless” or “aggressive” add little without that connection.
Separate an unsuccessful position from an unsupported one
Counsel should examine controlling precedent, the factual basis for ownership and copying, and the support for asserted defenses. A difficult fair-use dispute requires different treatment from a claim contradicted by an executed license.
Reasonableness also involves factual support. An argument may correctly describe copyright law yet depend on an ownership assertion that the record cannot sustain.
The motion should identify when decisive information became available. That chronology helps distinguish an initially supportable position from continued pursuit after discovery undermined its foundation. It also gives the opposing party a concrete opportunity to explain why its position remained reasonable.
Explain misconduct and deterrence independently
Kirtsaeng recognizes that litigation misconduct or repeated infringement or overaggressive assertion of claims can matter even when the losing legal position was reasonable.
A finding of objective reasonableness does not end the inquiry. The court must still consider whether other circumstances justify shifting fees.
Relevant submissions should identify particular filings, discovery conduct, or enforcement behavior. Ordinary disagreement, an unsuccessful motion, or refusal to accept a settlement demand does not by itself establish misconduct.
Registration Timing Can Limit an Owner’s Recovery
Before briefing discretion, a copyright owner must address Section 412. For ordinary infringement claims, that provision can bar attorney’s fees when infringement commenced before registration.
For published works, the statute includes a three-month registration grace period after first publication. However, a registration obtained after infringement begins does not automatically restore fee eligibility for continuing infringement.
Our discussion of copyright registration timing explains how registration dates and the commencement of infringement affect available remedies. Counsel should establish those dates from registration records, publication evidence, and the infringement chronology.
Section 412’s restriction concerns the owner’s recovery for infringement. It generally does not prevent a prevailing accused infringer from seeking fees under Section 505.
Registration requirements also perform different functions. Section 411(a) generally requires Copyright Office action before filing an infringement action involving a U.S. work, subject to exceptions and the refusal procedure. Section 412 addresses access to particular remedies.
Accordingly, satisfying a filing prerequisite does not establish fee eligibility. A late registration may leave an owner able to pursue infringement relief while limiting the remedies available after success.
Building or Opposing a Supported Fee Motion
A persuasive motion addresses both entitlement and amount. An opposition should do the same, because defeating particular billing entries does not resolve whether fee shifting is justified.
Preserve the procedural and evidentiary foundation
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B) ordinarily requires a fee motion within 14 days after entry of judgment, unless a statute or court order provides otherwise.
The submission should establish prevailing-party status, identify Section 505 as the basis for recovery, and address the relevant Fogerty considerations through the actual record.
Useful supporting materials include the dispositive rulings, pertinent correspondence, discovery orders, and evidence explaining why particular work became necessary. Counsel should distinguish recoverable copyright work from unrelated claims and explain any common factual or legal work.
For the responding party, pinpointing gaps in that connection is more effective than objecting generally to the litigation’s expense.
Support reasonable hours and rates
Courts commonly begin the amount analysis with reasonable hours multiplied by reasonable hourly rates. Contemporaneous time records and evidence supporting the requested rates give the court a usable basis for calculation.
The applicant should address duplication, excessive staffing, vague entries, and time spent on unsuccessful or unrelated matters where appropriate.
An opponent should identify disputed entries or categories and explain the proposed reductions. General complaints that the bill is too high rarely provide the same assistance.
Fee awards and denials remain subject to abuse-of-discretion review. A developed district-court record therefore matters to both sides.
Keep Fees Separate From Damages and Injunctions
Attorney’s fees compensate for qualifying legal work. They are distinct from the damages and profits available under Section 504.
Our guide to copyright infringement damages addresses actual damages, attributable profits, and statutory damages. Those recovery paths involve their own requirements and do not establish entitlement to fees.
Injunctive relief under Section 502 also requires a separate analysis. Ownership, registration, and liability do not automatically produce an injunction.
Similarly, a DMCA takedown request may remove online material without awarding damages or resolving every ownership dispute. These distinctions matter in settlement negotiations: a party should evaluate each requested remedy on its legal foundation, rather than treating success on infringement as a guarantee of every form of relief.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does an objectively reasonable defense prevent a fee award?
No. Its reasonableness receives substantial weight, but the court must consider other relevant circumstances. Litigation misconduct or particular compensation and deterrence concerns may still support an award.
The applicant must explain why those circumstances justify fees despite the strength of the losing position. The existence of discretion does not eliminate that burden of persuasion.
Does winning a novel copyright issue establish entitlement?
No. Kirtsaeng rejected an approach that would make a case’s law-clarifying importance the controlling consideration. A significant merits victory does not substitute for the full Section 505 analysis.
Counsel should connect the request to objective reasonableness and the remaining circumstances. The court’s task remains case-specific even when the merits decision has value beyond the parties.
Treat Fee Exposure as a Separate Litigation Issue
After Kirtsaeng, copyright fee awards require a structured exercise of discretion. Objective reasonableness receives substantial weight, while statutory eligibility and the remaining circumstances retain independent importance.
At Chase Lawyers, we help clients assess copyright disputes, available remedies, and litigation strategy. Addressing fee exposure early gives claims, defenses, and settlement positions a firmer financial foundation.
The strongest fee position connects the governing standard to a documented record and a reasonable, supported request.
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